NML, Bayes and true distributions: A comment on Karabatsos and Walker (2006) by Grunwald, P. & Navarro, D.
ACCEPTED VERSION
Peter Grünwald and Daniel J. Navarro
NML, Bayes and true distributions: A comment on Karabatsos and Walker (2006)
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 2009; 53(1):43-51
Copyright ©2009 Published by Elsevier Inc.
10.1016/j.jmp.2008.11.005
NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of
Mathematical Psychology. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review,
editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be
reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted
for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of Mathematical




Elsevier’s Policy: An author may use the preprint for personal use, internal institu-
tional use and for permitted scholarly posting.
...
Elsevier’s AAM Policy: Authors retain the right to use the accepted author manuscript for
personal use, internal institutional use and for permitted scholarly posting provided that
these are not for purposes of commercial use or systematic distribution.
Elsevier believes that individual authors should be able to distribute their AAMs for their
personal voluntary needs and interests, e.g. posting to their websites or their institution’s
repository, e-mailing to colleagues. However, our policies differ regarding the systematic
aggregation or distribution of AAMs to ensure the sustainability of the journals to which
AAMs are submitted. Therefore, deposit in, or posting to, subject-oriented or centralized
repositories (such as PubMed Central), or institutional repositories with systematic posting
mandates is permitted only under specific agreements between Elsevier and the repository,
agency or institution, and only consistent with the publisher’s policies concerning such
repositories. Voluntary posting of AAMs in the arXiv subject repository is permitted.
...
Permitted scholarly posting: Voluntary posting by an author on open websites operated by
the author or the author’s institution for scholarly purposes, as determined by the author,




NML, Bayes and True Distributions: A Comment on
Karabatsos and Walker (2006)
Peter Gru¨nwalda, Daniel J. Navarrob
a Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica, P.O. Box 94079 NL-1090 GB, The Netherlands
b School of Psychology, University of Adelaide, Adelaide SA 5005, Australia
Abstract
We review the normalized maximum likelihood (NML) criterion for selecting among compet-
ing models. NML is generally justified on information-theoretic grounds, via the principle of
minimum description length (MDL), in a derivation that “does not assume the existence of a
true, data-generating distribution.” Since this “agnostic” claim has been a source of some recent
confusion in the psychological literature, we explain in detail what is meant by this statement.
In doing so we discuss the work presented by Karabatsos and Walker (2006), who propose an
alternative Bayesian decision-theoretic characterization of NML, which leads them to conclude
that the claim of agnosticity is meaningless. In the KW derivation, one part of the NML criterion
(the likelihood term) arises from placing a Dirichlet process prior over possible data-generating
distributions, and the other part (the complexity term) is folded into a loss function. Whereas
in the original derivations of NML, the complexity term arises naturally, in the KW derivation
its mathematical form is taken for granted and not explained any further. We argue that for
this reason, the KW characterization is incomplete; relatedly, we question the relevance of the
characterization and we argue that their main conclusion about agnosticity does not follow.
Keywords: Minimum description length; normalized maximum likelihood; Bayesian inference
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1 Introduction1
The normalized maximum likelihood (NML) criterion for the selection among a collec-2
tion of models M1, . . . ,MD in light of observed data x = (x1 . . . xn) states that, where3




where f(x|θ,M) denotes the probability of the data according to modelM with param-5
eter values θ. In this expression, X n denotes the sample space of possible data sets of size6
n, and θˆ(y,M) is the maximum likelihood estimate obtained when model M is fit to7
data y.8
The NML probability can be derived as the solution to a number of different optimality9
problems (Shtarkov, 1987; Rissanen, 2001). It plays a prominent role in the minimum10
description length (MDL) approach to statistical inference, originating from information11
theory. However, the NML distribution has also been given an interpretation from other12
statistical perspectives. Apart from the information-theoretic derivation, there are three13
other standard derivations of the NML probability (see Gru¨nwald 2007): the prequential14
interpretation (briefly discussed in the appendix), a differential-geometric interpretation15
(in which the denominator in (1) is interpreted as a volume; see, e.g., Balasubramanian16
2005) and a Bayesian interpretation (which links (1) to Bayes factor model selection based17
on a Jeffreys’ prior). Importantly, the information-theoretic and prequential derivations18
of NML do not rely on the assumption of a “true”, data-generating distribution. In this19
sense, NML is an “agnostic” method, which suggests that it behaves robustly in situations20
in which all models under consideration are wrong, yet some are useful.21
In a recent paper, Karabatsos and Walker (2006) (KW from now on) propose an al-22
ternative Bayesian decision theoretic interpretation for the NML criterion, from which23
they argue that it is meaningless to make claims about NML being an agnostic method.24
However, there are a number of difficulties with their proposal, which we discuss in this25
paper. The plan of this paper is as follows: we begin by providing a brief discussion of the26
information-theoretic view of NML (Section 2). Following this, in Section 3, we explain in27
detail the meaning and implication of the “agnostic” property of NML. We then turn to28
the KW characterization itself (Section 4), and our concerns with it (Sections 5 and 6).29
We make some concluding remarks in Section 7. For the benefit of readers who are not30
familiar with information theory, the paper ends with an appendix in which one of the31
alternative interpretations of NML — the prequential one — is explained in some detail.32
2
2 The Information-Theoretic View on NML33
The MDL principle states that we should prefer those models that allow us to compress34
the data set x to the greatest possible extent. That is, if the codelength LC(x) denotes35
the number of bits required to describe x using some code C, then we should prefer36
those models that allows us to produce short codelengths. We are able to talk about data37
compression using probabilistic language thanks to the Kraft inequality, which tells us38
that for any probability mass function f defined on a sample space X n, there exists a39
uniquely decodable code C such that, for all y ∈ X n, the codelength is given by LC(y) =40
− log f(y). Vice versa, for any uniquely decodable code C, there exists a mass function f41
that satisfies this equality. This establishes a 1-to-1 correspondence between probability42
mass functions and uniquely decodable codes. Essentially the same correspondence holds,43
after appropriate discretization, if f is a density rather than a mass function.44
The most well-known derivation of the NML distribution from the MDL perspective is45
Rissanen’s (2001) work, which slightly extends an earlier derivation by Shtarkov (1987).46
Given a model M that is parametrized by θ ∈ Θ, Shtarkov demonstrates that the NML47
probability p∗(x|M) in Equation 1 corresponds to the “best” possible coding that can be48
achieved using M. Shtarkov defines the best coding scheme that a model can achieve in49
a minimax sense, as the one that satisfies the following equality:50







where the minimum is over all distributions p that can be defined on X n, and the maximum51
is over all possible datasets y ∈ X n. The expression in square brackets is called the regret :52
when applied to the actually-observed data x, it is the additional number of bits one53
needs to code the data x using (the code based on) p, compared to the code in M that,54
with hindsight, turns out to minimize the codelength (maximize the probability) of x.55
The latter code is invariably the code based on the ML (maximum likelihood) estimator56
f(·|θˆ(x,M)). Thus, we seek, among all distributions (codes) p on X n, the one such that57
the worst-case regret is minimized. Regarding the more general question of why it makes58
sense to solve a minimax problem of this kind, the appendix contains a brief discussion;59
but the interested reader is referred to Gru¨nwald (2007) for an extensive discussion. For60
the current purposes, it suffices to note that a key point in the specification of this minimax61
problem is that it does not matter what probability distribution generated the data x,62
or whether such a “true” distribution even exists: the NML distribution satisfies certain63
optimality criteria that depend only on the data. We elaborate this point in detail in the64
following section. Then, in Section 4–6, we discuss the KW derivation and our criticisms65
of it.66
3
3 The Role of True Distributions67
It is useful to think of hypothesis testing and model selection methods as algorithms.68
These algorithms usually take as input a finite or countably infinite list M1,M2, . . . of69
models (families of probability distributions), as well as data x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ X n. They70
output a particular model M from the list, or, more generally, they assign a weight or71
probability to each model on the list. We now look at the role of “true” distributions, first72
(Section 3.1) in the design of such algorithms, and then (Section 3.2) in the analysis of73
such algorithms. For the specific case of MDL algorithms such as (but not restricted to)74
NML, Gru¨nwald (2007, ch. 16 and 17) discusses these issues in far more detail.75
3.1 True Distributions in the Design of Algorithms76
For some methods, such as traditional Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing and AIC model77
selection, the corresponding algorithms have explicitly been designed to achieve a certain78
specified performance under the assumption that one of the distributions p in one of79
the models under consideration is exactly true, i.e. the data are sampled from p. Other80
methods, such as cross-validation and NML-based model selection, do not rely on such81
an assumption in order to construct the algorithm. For instance, Shtarkov’s derivation of82
NML as the solution to the minimax problem in Equation 2 treats the observed data x83
as fixed, without invoking any assumptions about what mechanism produced those data84
in the first place.85
As an example of a procedure for which the design explicitly relies on some assumptions86
about the true generating mechanism, consider the following simple problem. Suppose we87
we want to choose between a model M1 = {f(· | µ) | µ ∈ R} and its submodel M0 =88
{f(· | µ) | µ = 0), where, for x ∈ X n, f(x | µ) is the standard normal density, extended89
to n outcomes by independence. In the Neyman-Pearson approach to this problem, we90
perform a hypothesis test with µ = 0 as the null hypothesis, and µ 6= 0 as the alternative.91
Viewed as an algorithm, such a test takes data x ∈ X n as input, and it outputs “reject92
M0,” or “accept M0”, possibly together with a p-value. For simplicity, we assume the93
significance level is fixed at 0.01. This means that the test (algorithm) has been designed94
such that the type-I error is at most 0.01: if the data are sampled fromM0, the probability95
of output “reject” is at most 0.01; moreover, among all algorithms with this property, we96
use the one for which the type-II error is minimized. Now, notice that the type-I error97
is defined in terms of the probability of obtaining a particular kind of data set if model98
M0 is true. Similarly, the type-II error describes the probability of obtaining a different99
kind of data set if (some element of) model M1 is true. The design of the algorithm thus100
crucially depends on the data being sampled either from M0 or M1. As a consequence,101
an awkward problem arises if the data are not sampled from either of the two models.102
Under such circumstances, both the accept/reject decision and the corresponding p-value103
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have no clear interpretation any more, as they are probabilities of events according to104
some distributions that we already know are not the data-generating distributions. This105
situation is by no means uncommon: in practice, we often know in advance that all106
models under consideration are, to some extent, wrong. Instead of trying to identify the107
true model, in such a situation we may want to choose the model that, hopefully, is the108
“best” in the sense that it leads to the best predictions about future data coming from109
the same source. The Neyman-Pearson test has not been designed for such a situation,110
and, as we have just seen, its outputs cannot easily be interpreted any more. In particular,111
even though we put our significance level at 0.01, we certainly cannot claim anymore that,112
by following the procedure repeatedly in a variety of contexts, only once in about a 100113
times will we encounter the situation that we reject M0 even though it leads to better114
predictions than M1.115
The example suggests that if none of our models are perfect – as is usually the case –116
then we should use statistical algorithms whose output is a function only of how well117
the actually observed sequence of data can be predicted based on the given models. To118
make this precise, we need to define what it means to “predict based on a given model.”119
This can be done in various ways. Let us consider two examples: leave-one-out cross-120
validation (LOOCV; see Browne 2000), an approach to model selection that is popular in121
the machine learning community; and NML. In LOOCV, for all outcomes xi, one predicts122
xi on the basis of the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator θˆ(x \ xi), i.e. based on all123
observed data except xi itself. The quality of predicting xi with density or mass function124
fθ is measured in terms of the log loss, defined as loss(xi, f) := − log f(xi): the smaller125
the loss, the better the prediction. According to LOOCV, we should select the modelMj126
which minimizes the sum of all prediction errors,
∑n
i=1 loss(xi, f(· | θˆ(x \ xi,Mj))). The127
NML approach is based on the same loss function, but, as explained in the appendix,128
rather than predicting by using the leave-one-out ML estimator, one sequentially predicts129
the full sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn) using the prediction strategy that is worst-case optimal130
relative to the element of M that one should have used with hindsight, the worst-case131
being taken over all possible data sequences.132
Summarizing, we may broadly distinguish between truth-dependent approaches such as133
Neyman-Pearson tests and AIC, 1 and agnostic approaches such as cross-validation and134
NML. Truth-dependent approaches are designed to give good results with high probability135
or in expectation according to some distribution p. In agnostic approaches, distributions136
1 To see that AIC is a truth-dependent approach, note that it tells us to select the model
minimizing AIC(x, d) = − log f(x | θˆ(x,Md)) + d, where d is the model dimension. While the
first term is “agnostic”, the second term (d) is truth-dependent, since it has been designed to
make AIC(x, d) an unbiased estimator of the prediction loss that can be achieved with model
Md. “Unbiased” means “giving the right answer in expectation,” the expectation being taken
under a distribution p that is assumed to be in a (suitably defined) closure of the list of models
M1,M2, . . .. We note that Bayesian inference cannot easily be put into one of the two categories:
some variations may be called truth-dependent, others may not (Gru¨nwald 2007, ch. 17).
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are only used as predictors, and the merit of a model in light of the data x is solely137
determined by how well such distributions predict x. It is in this sense that introductory138
papers (e.g., Myung et al. 2006) describe NML as being “free” from assumptions about139
true distribution: it is an agnostic method by design.140
Having made this distinction between agnostic and truth-dependent procedures, it is141
worth considering the advantages built into the agnostic methods. Besides avoiding the142
previously-discussed problem of non-interpretable outputs, agnostic methods also have143
another advantage: when comparing a finite number of models with an agnostic approach,144
the better model must win, eventually. To explain what this means (see Section 3.2 for145
more details) consider the case of just two models, Ma and Mb. Suppose one observes146
more and more data x1, x2, . . ., the sequence being such that the best predictor of the147
data in Ma eventually keeps outperforming the best predictor of the data in Mb. Given148
such a sequence, the agnostic approaches will eventually select Ma. Specifically, for an149

















loss(xi, f(· | θ,Mb)), (3)
one has the assurance that, for all large n larger than some n0, the model Ma will be151
selected rather than Mb. Here the number n0 may depend on the particular sequence152
x1, x2, . . .: for some sequences, the better model will be identified earlier than for others.153
For truth-dependent approaches, the guarantee that the best model will eventually be154
selected can only be given for a small subset of the sequences satisfying (3), namely those155
sequences x1, x2, . . . for which there exists a distribution f inMa∪Mb, so that x1, x2, . . .156
may be regarded as a “typical outcome” of f . In practice, however, we often have to deal157
with atypical outcomes: supposedly real-valued variables (e.g., normally distributed data)158
can very easily contain repeated values – cases where xi = xj for some i 6= j) – due159
to round-off errors and other imperfections, an occurrence that should have probability160
0 (see, e.g., Gru¨nwald, 2007, ch. 17). More generally, real-world data sets tend to be161
riddled with data missing not at random, data entry errors, and (particularly in the social162
sciences) a host of weak correlations (e.g., Meehl 1990). The net result is that, in many163
cases, even very large empirical data sets will have some characteristics that make them164
rather atypical sequences. It is also for this reason that the predictive guarantees for the165
agnostic approaches are in practice somewhat reassuring.166
The previous remarks notwithstanding, it is worth pointing out that there is, of course, a167
weak spot in the agnostic approaches: one can measure prediction error in many different168
ways, so why should one focus on the log loss? The model that predicts best in terms of169
log loss may not be the best in terms of some other loss functions such as 0/1-loss. Indeed,170
there are approaches which try to extend MDL and related approaches beyond the log loss171
(Gru¨nwald 2007, ch. 17); the methodology of structural risk minimization (Vapnik, 1998)172
may also be viewed in this manner. Nevertheless, there are certain properties of the log173
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loss which make it particularly attractive, such as the fact that it is the only local proper174
scoring rule (Bernardo & Smith, 1994), that it has a clear interpretation in terms of data175
compression and sequential gambling (Gru¨nwald, 2007), and, as we discuss below, that it176
has good convergence properties in the hypothetical case in which the true distribution177
does reside in one of the models after all.178
3.2 True Distributions in the Analysis of Algorithms179
At this point, we turn to a discussion of the performance of different model selection180
algorithms. As with the previous discussion regarding the design of the methods, it is181
useful to analyze the methods under different assumptions about the nature of the data182
generating mechanism. Suppose that a method is applied to data x = x1, . . . , xn, and the183
inferred model is then used to make predictions about future data y = xn+1, . . . , xn+m.184
If the data generating machinery may change in arbitrary ways at time n + 1, then no185
method can be expected to work well. In such extreme scenarios, agnostic approaches will186
fail to make good predictions just as much as truth-dependent methods. In order for any187
method to work well, there has to be some kind of constraining mechanism which pertains188
to both x and y. It is therefore of some interest to compare the actual behavior of some189
well-known agnostic and truth-dependent model selection methods for a variety of such190
constraining mechanisms. Following Gru¨nwald (2007), let us consider what are arguably191
the four most important cases:192
1. Mechanism satisfies Equation 3. Suppose we are to choose between two possible193
models M0 and M1, and that the constraining mechanism is such that Equation 3194
holds, either for a = 0, b = 1 or vice versa. This may be one of the weakest assumptions195
under which some form of inductive inference is possible at all. In this case, NML,196
the Bayes factor method, BIC, LOOCV and AIC will all select the best-predicting197
modelMa for all large enough samples. In such cases, for large n, the truth-dependent198
component of AIC(x, d) becomes negligible compared to its agnostic component. If,199
however, we assume that M0 is nested into M1, and Equation 3 holds with equality,200
then NML, BIC and the Bayes factor method will select M0 for large n (a form of201
Occam’s razor), whereas for many sequences, AIC and LOOCV will not. Gru¨nwald202
(2007) argues extensively why such a version of Occam’s razor is desirable. Note that203
all this holds quite irrespective of whether the “true” data generating mechanism is204
in any of the models, or is even a probability distribution; it may just as well be205
deterministic.206
If we allow the list of models to contain an arbitrary but finite number of elements,207
then the same story still holds. However, in practice, this list is often countably infinite,208
or (equivalently, as it turns out), it is allowed to grow with n. The prototypical exam-209
ple is linear regression with polynomials, where the outcomes are pairs (Z,X), with,210
say, Z ∈ [−1, 1] and X ∈ R. Model Md prescribes that X = ∑d−1j=0 αjZj + U , where211
(α0, . . . , αd−1) is a parameter vector and U is normally distributed noise with mean 0.212
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We would like to learn the best polynomial model of the data, without assuming any213
a priori bound on the degree d. In such cases, there can be data sequences for which a214
particular degree d0 leads, asymptotically, to the best predictions, yet, no matter how215
many data are observed, none of the methods will select degree d0, not even the agnostic216
ones.
217
2. True distribution in one of the models. At the other extreme, suppose we have218
the collection of models M1,M2, . . ., where the k-th model has k free parameters.219
Moreover, the data are sampled from a distribution f(· | θ,Md) that falls inside the220
d-th model. In this situation, NML and other MDL-related methods, as well as BIC and221
the Bayes factor method, perform very well in the sense that, for all d such that Md222
is on the list, for almost all f(· | θ,Md), with f(· | θ,Md)-probability 1, they output223
“Md” for all large n. For an explanation of the “almost”, see Gru¨nwald (2007). AIC and224
leave-one-out cross-validation do not share this property of statistical consistency, and225
may, with positive probability, output a model of larger dimension than the minimal226
d for which Md contains the true distribution. These results hold both if the list of227
models is finite and if it is countably infinite.
228
3. True distribution in model closure. A commonly studied situation in statistics is229
to assume that the listM1,M2, . . . is countable, and that data are sampled from some230
distribution p, which is not in any of the models of the list, but which can be arbitrarily231
well-approximated by the list, in the sense that limd→∞minf∈Md D(p, f) = 0. Here D is232
some suitably chosen distance measure for probability distributions. In our polynomial233
example, this would correspond to the true p stating that X = g(Z) + U , where g is a234
continuous function on [−1, 1] that is, however, not itself a polynomial. In such cases,235
the best predictions can be obtained by choosing a small model at small sample sizes,236
and gradually choosing more complex models (higher-order polynomials) as the sample237
size increases. Qualitatively speaking, Bayes factor, BIC, AIC, NML and LOOCV all238
behave in this manner. But a more detailed view reveals important differences: if the239
modelsM1,M2, . . . are sufficiently regular, and the distribution p is sufficiently smooth,240
then AIC and LOOCV will converge faster than NML, BIC and Bayes. More precisely,241
suppose we fix a method and for each n, we use it to infer a model and then predict242
future data based on that model. For all methods, the expected prediction loss will get243
smaller as n increases, and it will converge to the same asymptotic optimum. However,244
the convergence is slower (by a logarithmic factor) for Bayes, BIC and NML. On the245
other hand, if either (a) the models M1,M2, . . . are not “regular”, or, (b), if the true246
p is not smooth, then AIC may fail dramatically, whereas Bayes factor, LOOCV and247
NML will still tend to converge. A common example of (a) is model selection for feature248
selection models, in which the number of considered models with d degrees of freedom249
is exponential in d (Yang 1999). An example of (b) within the polynomial setting arises250
if the function g is discontinuous, or if it tends to ±∞ at the boundaries of its domain.251
This failure of AIC is due to its truth-dependent nature: it has simply not been designed252
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to work well for true distributions that are as in situation (a) and (b).
253
4. True distribution not in model closure. Finally, consider the possibility that there254
exists a true distribution p that cannot be arbitrarily well-approximated by members255
of models M1,M2, . . ., while nevertheless, some model Md contains a useful f that is256
“close” to p in that it tends to predict data reasonably well. This case is related to but257
less general than scenario 1 above, and essentially the same facts hold. To illustrate,258
suppose for simplicity that the data are i.i.d. according to both the ‘true’ p and all f259
in all of the M1,M2, . . . under consideration, and suppose that one of the models is260




Ep[loss(X, f(· | θ,Ma))] < min
b:b6=a,Mb on the list
min
f(·|θ)∈Mb
Ep[loss(X, f(· | θ,Mb))].
(4)
If the list is finite, say M1, . . . ,MD, and (4) holds, then, with p-probability 1, all263
methods will select modelMa for all large enough sample sizes n. This means that, the264
p-probability that a suboptimal model Mb, b 6= a is selected based on data X1, . . . , Xn265
goes to 0 with increasing n, where the exact rate at which it goes to 0 may depend266
on the precise relation between p and the various models on the list. In case that the267
models are nested and (4) holds with equality, then, once again, for large n, NML, Bayes268
factor and BIC will tend to select the smallest model Ma that achieves the minimum269
in (4), whereas, for some combinations of p and M1, . . . ,MD, AIC and LOOCV will270
not. In case (4) holds but the list is countably infinite, then there exist scenarios in271
which none of the methods work fine for large samples, i.e. they keep selecting models272
that are further than some  from the minimum (4), no matter how large n. Here 273
is a positive constant, and, being a constant, it does not tend to 0 with increasing n274
(Gru¨nwald and Langford 2007). Thus, neither NML (despite its agnosticity) nor the275
Bayes factor method are guaranteed to work in such a scenario. The only methods we276
are aware of that handle such a scenario well are those developed in the structural risk277
minimization literature (Vapnik, 1998), but they tend to perform less than optimal in278
scenario 2 and 3 (Gru¨nwald 2007).279
The upshot is that even agnostic methods may not always work well in all relevant set-280
tings. Nevertheless, we may still expect agnostic methods to be more robust than truth-281
dependent methods. Moreover, if a method that performs well in all settings 1–4 will282
ever be found, it is sure to be a method of the distribution-free kind. As an aside, Van283
Erven, Gru¨nwald & De Rooij (2007) present an agnostic approach that combines the best284
of NML and LOOCV, and is probably the first known method that provably performs285
well in all cases discussed under settings 2 and 3 above; yet it still fails with countably286
infinite lists in settings 1 and 4.287
To summarize, in this section we have aimed to give a general overview of the role played288
by the concept of a “true distribution” for a variety of different model selection algorithms.289
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We have done so in part because we think it provides a useful expansion of the necessarily-290
oversimplified treatment given in tutorial papers (e.g., Myung et al. 2006). However, it291
also provides an appropriate foundation for our discussion of the claims made recently by292
KW. It is to this topic that we now turn.293
4 A Bayesian Decision-Theoretic View on NML294
In a recent paper, KW provide a Bayesian decision theoretic interpretation for the NML295
criterion, and use this interpretation to suggest that it is meaningless to refer to NML as296
an agnostic method. In order to characterize NML in terms of the more general Bayesian297
decision-theoretic framework, tshe derivation relies on three key premises:298
(1) Data arise from some unknown distribution (i.e., x ∼ G), and we have a prior over299
this distribution described by a Dirichlet process (DP; see Ferguson, 1973) with300
concentration parameter c→ 0 (i.e., G ∼ DP(G0, 0)).301
(2) We want to select a parameter θ˙ that belongs to one of the modelsM1, . . . ,MD, and302
in addition to the loss incurred due to the expected Kullback-Leibler discrepancy303
between f(·|θ˙,M) and the true distribution G, we suffer a “complexity penalty”304
v(M, n) that depends only on the model M from which θ˙ is drawn and the sample305
size n.306
(3) The complexity penalty v(M, n) is defined by307




KW show that under conditions (1) and (2), the optimal Bayesian choice for θ˙ is the ML308
estimator θˆ(x,Md) within the model Md that minimizes, over all d ∈ {1, . . . , D},309
− log f(x|θˆ(x,Md)) + v(Md, n). (6)
Thus, they conclude, if the penalty term (5) is plugged into (6), then the optimal Bayesian310
choice is to select θ˙ from the model Md∗ , where d∗ is given by311
d∗ = arg mind
{
− log f(x|θˆ(x,Md)) + log ∫Xn f(y|θˆ(y,Md))dy
}
= arg maxd p
∗(x | Md),
(7)
where p∗ is given by (1), and the second equality follows because the logarithm is a mono-312
tonically increasing function. Hence, when assumptions (1)-(3) are met, the Bayes optimal313
model coincides with the model preferred under the NML criterion. In the following sec-314
tions we critically discuss this derivation and its supposed implications. In doing so, we315
10
distinguish between two major problems (Section 5) and three minor concerns (Section 6).316
We also briefly comment on another issue brought up by KW, namely the fact that for317
many models, the NML is undefined (Section 7).318
5 Major Problems319
In this section, we raise two major sources of concern with the KW derivation, namely320
that it is incomplete in an essential sense (Section 5.1), and that the main conclusion321
drawn from the derivation does not follow (Section 5.2). However, we wish to emphasize322
that our concerns do not lie with the formal aspects to the derivation itself, which appears323
to be entirely correct.324
5.1 Incompleteness of the Characterization325
In the context of discussing what conclusions can be drawn from their derivation, KW326
(p. 520) state that they have “discovered the NML criterion using Bayesian decision the-327
ory.” (emphasis added). This statement highlights one of the main problems we have328
with their characterization, namely that it does not provide any Bayesian interpretation,329
characterization or explanation of the complexity term (5). Rather, they show that any330
model selection criterion of a “fit plus complexity” format is consistent with the Bayesian331
framework, using assumptions (1) and (2) above. The specific application to NML via332
assumption (3) is not explained anywhere in their paper – it is simply introduced on p.333
519 with no justification given other than the statement that it is “[an] alternative penalty334
term . . . for model simplicity”. They do not state why this particular penalty term would335
be of interest to the statistician, even though it is clearly an essential component to NML.336
After all, it is exactly this term that distinguishes the NML criterion from many other ex-337
isting criteria such as AIC and BIC. In our view, this is not really a “discovery” at all, and338
it makes it hard to see how their characterization is helpful or informative as to the nature339
of NML itself. Indeed, the KW derivation can also be used to “discover” BIC and (as KW340
in fact point out themselves) AIC — two criteria that behave very differently from NML341
in many situations (see Section 3). This is achieved simply by replacing v(Md, n) as in (5)342
by (kd/2) log n (which yields BIC) or kd (producing AIC), where kd is the dimensionality343
of model Md. There is no particular reason given for the use of one penalty function344
over any other one. This differs from all four previously existing interpretations of NML,345
each of which derives the penalty term from some more basic considerations. 2 In short,346
2 Moreover, this is also the case for the original derivations of the AIC and the BIC. Akaike
(1973) derived AIC by correcting for a bias in the model selection procedure implied by maximum
likelihood methods, while Schwarz (1978) derived BIC by taking an asymptotic expansion of the
logarithm of the Bayesian marginal probabilities.
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it seems to us that the KW derivation is incomplete in a very fundamental sense, because347
it does not give any reason why a statistical decision-maker should adopt a complexity348
term that has the specific mathematical form specified in assumption (5).349
To illustrate the point, consider the following (highly exaggerated) example. To our knowl-350
edge, no-one has seriously proposed the use of a penalty function of the form351
v(Md, n) =
 0 if Md is Favorite Model X∞ otherwise (8)
but clearly, it would be straightforward to substitute this penalty function into the deriva-352
tion provided by KW and thereby “discover” a model selection criterion that always353
prefers Favorite Model X. Taking KW at face value, we would be able to say that we354
have derived the criterion using Bayesian decision theory. However, it would be entirely355
unreasonable to specify v(Md, n) in this fashion, and (we hope) no-one would accept the356
proposition that Bayesian methods actually justify this sort of behavior. Obviously, the357
problem is that we have provided no justification whatsoever for adopting this particular358
choice of v(Md, n), and so any analyses we conduct on the basis of this choice would359
be of little interest to any statistician, Bayesian or otherwise. The point here is that the360
“Bayesian discovery” of NML made by KW is of exactly the same character as the “dis-361
covery” of the criterion that always prefers model X: namely, it demonstrates that NML362
is consistent with Bayesian theory, but provides no actual reason to use it in any practical363
situation. Their derivation is so broad as to encompass any criterion of a “fit plus penalty”364
format. This, in our view, cannot be called a “discovery” in any interesting sense.365
The point of the previous example is to illustrate the importance of having some reason366
for choosing a particular penalty function. With that in mind, one way to think about367
our argument is to ask the following question: “if someone else had not already proposed368
the NML approach, would any Bayesian ever have contemplated the complexity term (5)369
in combination with this particular Dirichlet process prior?” It seems unlikely – indeed,370
KW state explicitly that it “is difficult to understand as a penalty term” (p. 520), with371
the implication that this is an inherent problem for NML. This is somewhat unfortunate,372
since the information-theoretic perspective provides a very natural interpretation of this373
term, as the minimax coding or prediction regret (Appendix A). Accordingly, we have374
a good information-theoretic reason to use NML. The problem here is that there is no375
corresponding Bayesian interpretation provided by KW. Without having been implicitly376
guided by the information-theoretic results provided by Rissanen (2001), Shtarkov (1987)377
and others, it seems highly unlikely that any Bayesian would be inclined to choose v(M, n)378
in the manner specified in (5), making KW’s (2006) derivation somewhat post hoc at best.379
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5.2 Unjustified Conclusions380
In the previous section, we raised the concern that KW’s derivation is incomplete, since381
it provides no basis for the choice of penalty function. In essence, we were arguing that382
the derivation – though technically correct – is not particularly helpful. In this section, we383
raise a different concern, namely the fact that KW appear to assert some kind of special384
privilege to their proof over other proofs, somehow invalidating the logic of previous385
justifications for the use of NML. The relevant quote from their paper is as follows: after386
completing their derivation, KW (p. 520) suggest that387
[T]he idea that NML makes no mention of a true distribution is a meaningless point.388
We have discovered the NML criterion using Bayesian decision theory and have, as a389
component of this procedure, explicitly introduced the notion of a true distribution390
function.391
Importantly, this is the main conclusion of the paper. The premise here appears to be392
that “NML can be derived when we assume that a true distribution exists”, from which393
they draw the conclusion that “previous derivations that did not need this assumption394
are meaningless”.395
We have four problems with this statement. Firstly and most importantly, it is hard to396
see how this conclusion can possibly follow from the premise. Nothing in KW’s derivation397
falsifies the logic of the previous constructions provided by Shtarkov and Rissanen, so to398
the extent that those derivations were valid previously, they remain so now. Accordingly,399
there is still a perfectly good reason to use NML even if no data-generating distribution400
exists (see Section 3). While we agree that NML can be derived when a true distribution401
is assumed, it is hardly meaningless to observe that we can derive NML without having402
to make this assumption.403
Our second problem is somewhat related to the first, in that one of the strengths of404
the original NML proof is that it makes only very weak assumptions (though, even so405
they are sometimes violated; see Section 7), implying that NML may be used in a broad406
range of situations. By contrast, the three conditions that apply to KW’s derivation are407
fairly restrictive, and would only justify the use of NML in a few specific situations: for408
instance, KW require that our prior beliefs about the true data-generating distribution be409
captured by the statement G ∼ DP(G0, 0), whereas no such restrictions are required for410
Rissanen’s or Shtarkov’s proofs to hold. Thirdly, as argued previously in Section 5.1, the411
KW derivation is incomplete in a fashion that other derivations are not, so in our view it412
would be preferable to use one of the other proofs to justify the use of NML. Finally, as413
we will discuss in Section 6, there are some doubts as to how reasonable the underlying414
assumptions are, so unlike the other derivations of NML that hold quite generally, the415
KW approach does not necessarily apply in practical situations.416
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Similarly, though it is somewhat tangential to their derivation, KW also note that NML417
sometimes corresponds to the Bayes factor approach to model selection with Jeffreys’418
prior, and write (on p. 519)419
Bayes factors are recognized as being based on a 0-1 loss function which implicitly420
assumes that one of the models under consideration is the true model. This contradicts421
one of the key ideas for NML, namely that it is free from assumptions of a true model.422
The first criticism of the previous statement still applies here: neither Rissanen’s deriva-423
tion, nor the prequential derivation given in the appendix, require the existence of a true424
distribution or a 0/1-loss function. The fact that there is also a Bayesian derivation that425
does assume these things and establishes a correspondence to Jeffreys’ prior is irrelevant;426
it simply does not make the various other derivations meaningless or false.427
6 Minor Issues428
We proceed to discuss some minor concerns about the KW derivation, relating to the429
specification of the prior, the characterization of the decision problem, and inconsistencies430
with the assumptions used in previous work. Unlike the problems raised in the previous431
section, none of these issues should be taken to be strong criticisms of the paper, so much432
as minor caveats. We consider each of these in turn.433
6.1 Specification of the prior434
The KW paper relies on a Bayesian decision-maker who places a Dirichlet process (DP)435
prior (Ferguson, 1973) to describe his or her prior beliefs about an unknown probability436
distribution G. The DP prior is used to place a “nonparametric” prior over G, in which437
one seeks to avoid making restrictive assumptions about the family of distributions to438
which G might belong. From a Bayesian perspective, the nonparametric approach requires439
us to select a prior distribution that has broad support across the space of probability440
distributions. The DP prior serves this purpose, and specifies a distribution over random441
probability measures, parametrized by the base distribution G0 (corresponding roughly442
to one’s initial guess about G), and a concentration parameter c. However, although443
the DP has full (weak) support, it concentrates (with probability 1) on a set of discrete444
distributions (e.g., Sethuraman, 1994), which tends to limit its usefulness as a generic prior445
in some cases (e.g., Petrone & Raftery, 1997). In some contexts, however, the restriction446
to discrete distributions is actually quite useful, and for this very reason the DP has447
become a popular choice for specifying priors over countable mixtures (e.g., Escobar &448
West 1995).449
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It is important to note that KW use the DP in the general sense, using the limiting DP450
prior with c → 0 to describe the prior belief about a generic unknown distribution G.451
The result is that, as they note, they rely on a prior that concentrates with probability452
1 on point-mass distributions. This reliance plays an important role in their subsequent453
derivation: under this limiting prior, the Bayesian predictive distribution for future data454
converges to the empirical distribution of x (e.g., Ghosh & Ramamoorthi, 2003, Theorem455
3.2.7). This in turn implies that the Bayesian maximum utility parameter estimate under456
Kullback-Leibler loss is equivalent to the frequentist MLE θˆ(x,M) (as discussed by KW).457
Obviously, this does not hold for other values of c, since in general the predictive distri-458
bution under a DP prior is a weighted mixture of G0 and the empirical distribution. In459
short, although technically correct, the correspondence that they establish holds only for460
this rather odd special case; a case that KW appear to have chosen primarily to ensure461
that their Bayesian parameter estimation procedure mimics a frequentist one. 3462
6.2 Specification of the decision problem463
A second issue relates to the manner in which KW specify the decision problem. The464
Bayesian decision procedure described by KW equates the utility of a model with the465
utility of its best parameter value. This manner of setting up the problem is highly biased466
towards complex models, since in its simplest form it reduces to picking the model that467
can provide the best fit in a maximum likelihood sense. In order to redress this, they468
then introduce a complexity penalty into the utility function, as suggested by Kadane469
and Dickey (1980). We note that such an approach, while certainly correct, is by no470
means standard Bayesian practice. In a standard Bayesian textbook, Berger (1985, p.471
284) argues that one of the advantages of the Bayesian approach is that it automatically472
takes model complexity into account, without the need for any explicit penalties (Mackay473
(2003) refers to this as the “Bayesian Occam’s razor”). Indeed, this does happen under474
standard parametric priors and standard utility functions (possibly, but not necessarily475
of the 0/1-type; see, e.g. Bernardo & Smith 1994, ch. 6). However, by associating model476
utility with maximum likelihood parameter utility, KW are unable to take advantage of477
one of the most useful features of Bayesian inference, and are forced to reintroduce it via478
the unexplained penalty function v(M, n).479
3 Moreover, although it appears in the model-selection procedure described by Equation 1, when
using MDL one would generally not use the MLE as one’s optimal parameter choice within the
selected model. This point is particularly important and we will return to it in Section 6.3.
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6.3 Incompatibility with assumptions of the original derivation480
A third point to make is that KW’s characterization actually discards a number of the481
existing parallels between MDL and Bayesian methods. As discussed, the NML criterion482
originally arose as a specific instance of the broader MDL approach to inductive inference,483
which is in fact closely related to Bayesian inference (see Gru¨nwald 2007, p. 531-550). Just484
as in the Bayesian approach, MDL inference invariably starts by putting a distribution on485
observables. In the NML version of MDL discussed here, one actually puts a uniform prior486
pi(d) = 1/D on the model set {M1, . . . ,MD} (and indeed when one compares countably487
infinitely many models, the prior on the model index d becomes essential in the MDL488
approach; see Gru¨nwald, 2007, p. 406 & p. 423). One then associates each modelMd with489
a distribution on X n, in this case the NML distribution p∗(x | Md) given by (1). Thus,490
under the more typical Bayesian characterization of NML, the criterion may be interpreted491
as advocating a “maximum posterior model”Md under a uniform prior distribution on d.492
Accordingly, the NML criterion (as with other versions of MDL) already has a Bayesian493
flavor, with the NML distribution p∗(x | Md) playing a role similar to the Bayesian494
marginal distribution p(x | Md) = ∫Θ p(x | θ,Md) dw(θ), for some prior distribution495
w. In fact, although we do not do so here, it is not too difficult to construct cases in496
which the Bayesian marginal probability corresponds to the NML probability more or497
less exactly (this can be made to hold for any sample size n, with the usual convergence498
to a Jeffreys’ prior as n → ∞). These relationships, however, are completely lost in the499
KW derivation, because KW decouple the two terms that comprise the NML criterion.500
In their approach, the numerator f(x|θˆ(x,M)) arises as a consequence of the DP(G0, 0)501
prior, while the denominator
∫
Xn f(y|θˆ(y,M))dy is a consequence of the loss function.502
The fact that the denominator is in fact the integral of the maximized likelihood in the503
numerator (hence giving rise to the name normalized maximum likelihood, and making504
p∗(· | Md) a distribution over possible data sets) actually becomes irrelevant in KW’s505
approach.506
In much the same manner, it should be noted that in MDL approaches to density es-507
timation relative to a parametric model Md, one generally does not use a maximum508
likelihood estimator (this is explained further in the final paragraph of the appendix).509
Instead, MDL’s information-theoretic derivations lead one to adopt either a truncated510
ML estimator (in “two-part MDL”) or a predictive distribution (in “predictive MDL”)511
corresponding to a Bayesian predictive distribution relative to Md and some smooth512
prior on the model Md which varies from case to case. For example, with the Bernoulli513
model, the ML estimator after observing n biased coin tosses with h heads and n−h tails,514
would be p(heads) = h/n, whereas the predictive MDL estimator would be a smoothed515
version thereof, p(heads) = (h + 1
2
)/(n + 1) (Gru¨nwald, 2007, section 15.4). It is then516
surprising to see that KW’s derivation is based on a special nonparametric prior under517
which the Bayesian predictive distribution coincides with the maximum likelihood es-518
timate. Whereas most Bayesians, when working with a fixed parametric model, would519
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prefer using a Bayesian predictive distribution based on a smooth prior defined relative520
to modelMd, and MDL prescribes the use of the same or similar predictive distributions,521
KW rederive NML using a different predictive distribution.522
Summarizing, KW have discarded two facts which already make MDL inference closely523
related to mainstream Bayesian inference: the fact that the NML distribution is a dis-524
tribution, and the fact that MDL estimates/predictive distributions often coincide with525
Bayesian predictive distributions, but not with ML estimators. Of course, discarding these526
facts does not introduce any errors into their derivation, but it does mean that they are527
missing some of the very key components of the original work.528
7 Concluding Remarks529
Our main goal in this paper has been to discuss some of the problems associated with530
the KW derivation of NML probabilities, and to elaborate on the claim that NML does531
not depend on the assumption of a true distribution. However, we would like to end the532
paper by noting that there is one serious issue in which we agree with KW’s position: the533
NML approach has some technical difficulties which (at least in the simple form presented534
here), make it useless for many practical model selection tasks. The main problem is that535
the integral in the denominator diverges for some of the simplest and most often used536
parametric models, including the normal location and scale families. This issue has in fact537
been known since 1996 and is the subject of considerable discussion in the literature (see538
Gru¨nwald 2007, ch. 11). Although it is not central to their derivation, the issue is briefly539
raised by KW (on p. 520), so it is worth explicitly stating that we agree that this is a540
genuine, and quite serious, issue with the NML approach.541
More generally, we suspect that it may be the case that some researchers (including542
us) have at times overemphasized the importance of NML within the MDL framework,543
perhaps giving the impression that the two are equivalent. Given this possibility, it is544
important to note that the central idea in MDL is to base statistical inference on uni-545
versal coding (see Gru¨nwald 2007, for an extensive discussion): as it happens, the NML546
method is only one of at least five good methods for constructing universal codes, so the547
MDL framework is much broader than NML (only two of the 19 chapters in Gru¨nwald’s548
(2007) book deal primarily with NML, for instance). That said, because it has certain549
optimality properties which the other methods lack, NML has tended to be the preferred550
method in recent years. However, in those cases where NML cannot be applied, the other551
methods usually still can. Importantly, one of these five types of universal codes is based552
on Bayesian marginal likelihoods, and so it should be no surprise that there is generally a553
close correspondence between Bayesian and MDL methods. Nevertheless, this correspon-554
dence is of quite a different type than the KW derivation suggests.555
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A The Prequential Interpretation of NML620
Suppose we want to predict a sequence of outcomes x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) where each xi is621
an element of some space X . The xi are given to us one at a time. At each point in time i,622
we want to predict the next outcome xi, and, as we have already observed x1, . . . , xi−1, we623
can use these previous outcomes to guide our prediction. We assume that our predictions624
are probabilistic, i.e. they take the form of a probability distribution on X , identified with625
its density or mass function f . We measure the loss of predicting with f when the actual626
outcome is xi by loss(xi, f) := − log f(xi). This loss function arises naturally in data627
compression and gambling (Gru¨nwald 2007), but, being the only so-called “local proper628
scoring rule” (Bernardo & Smith, 1994), it is also frequently used in Bayesian statistics,629
where it is known as the “logarithmic score”.630
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A sequential prediction strategy S is a function that maps from the union of sample spaces631
∪n≥0 X n to the set P of distributions on X where the distributions are again identified632
with their densities or mass functions. That is,633
S : ∪n≥0X n → P .
In other words, a strategy S maps each possible sequence of arbitrary length (i.e., each634
element of ∪n≥0 X n) to a probabilistic prediction (i.e., an element of P ) for the next635
outcome. Thus S(x1, . . . , xi−1) = q means that somebody who uses strategy S will, upon636
observing sequence x1, . . . , xi−1, predict the next observation using the distribution q. If we637
adopt the standard convention that Xi denotes the ith random variable and xi denotes its638
observed outcome, then we would say that strategy S predicts that Xi | x1, . . . , xi−1 ∼ q.639
When the actual outcome xi is then observed, we would suffer the loss loss(xi, q) =640
− log q(xi). We define the loss of strategy S as the sum of its individual losses:641
loss(x1, . . . , xn, S) :=
n∑
i=1
loss(xi, S(x1, . . . , xi−1)).
In a seminal paper, Dawid (1984) called such strategies prequential forecasting systems ;642
for this reason we also call the following interpretation of NML “prequential”.643
LetM be a statistical model, i.e. a family of distributions on X n. Each distribution f(· | θ)644
in M can be used as a sequential prediction strategy Sθ in a straightforward fashion. To645
do so, we observe that x1, . . . , xi ∈ X i for all i, and so we can define646
Sθ(x1, . . . , xi) := f(Xi+1 = · | x1, . . . , xi, θ).
That is, the (i + 1)-st outcome is predicted using the conditional distribution for this647
outcome, given all past outcomes x1, . . . , xi. If the model assumes that data are i.i.d.,648
then the parameter set θ produces the simple prediction strategy Sθ(x1, . . . , xi) = f(· | θ),649
in which the predictions for each variable Xi+1 are the same, irrespective of the previously650
observed outcomes. For simplicity, we will henceforth assume that this simplification holds651
for the model M under consideration.652
Among all strategies Sθ corresponding to some f(· | θ) ∈ M, the best predictor for653
any given full sequence x = (x1, . . . , xn) is given by Sθˆ(x), where θˆ(x) is the maximum654
likelihood distribution for x. To see this, note that for each Sθ, the loss incurred on x is655
n∑
i=1
− log f(xi | θ) = − log
n∏
i=1
f(xi | θ) = − log f(x | θ),
so that the higher f(x | θ), the smaller the loss. The loss is minimized for θˆ(x), which is656
thus optimal among all f(· | θ) ∈M with hindsight. In reality, we do not have hindsight:657
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we do not know θˆ(x) until we have seen all xi, so we cannot expect to predict, for all658
x ∈ X n, as well as θˆ(x). But we can design a prediction strategy which, for each x, is659
almost as good as θˆ(x), in the sense that the additional loss it incurs overs θˆ(x) is as660





loss(x, S)− loss(x, Sθˆ(x))
]
(A.1)
is as small as possible. The expression between square brackets is called the prediction663
regret of strategy S relative to model M. It is straightforward to show that, whenever664
M is such that a minimax optimal strategy minimizing (A.1) exists, then, for all i, all665
x1, . . . , xi ∈ X i, its predictions S(x1, . . . , xi) coincide with p∗(Xi+1 = · | x1, . . . , xi) where666
p∗ is the NML distribution (1). In other words, the NML distribution can be thought667
of as a sequential prediction strategy that achieves the minimax optimal regret under668
logarithmic score. We emphasize that, even if the data are i.i.d. according to each f(· | θ),669
they are certainly not i.i.d. according to p∗: p∗(Xi+1 | x1, . . . , xi) will strongly depend670
on x1, . . . , xi, and will essentially behave like a smoothed version of the ML estimator671
f(· | θˆ(x1, . . . , xi)).672
Thus, if we use NML to select between a finite number of models M1, . . . ,MD, we are673
effectively, for each Md, sequentially predicting x1, . . . , xn using the strategy that is op-674
timal relative to Md, and in the end we select the model whose predictions yield the675
smallest total loss. Thus, we select the model that allows for the best possible sequential676
prediction of unseen data. As will be clear from the discussion in Section 3.1, this scheme677
is quite reminiscent of leave-one-out cross-validation with a logarithmic score. The precise678
relationship is discussed by Gru¨nwald (2007, ch. 17).679
Finally, we note that, just as there is an MDL approach to model selection, there also680
exist MDL methods for prediction and density estimation. One standard way to define681
such MDL predictions and estimates based on a sample x1, . . . , xi is in fact based on682
the “prequential” setup above. The distribution f(· | θ) ∈ M that is imagined to have683
generated the data is estimated as p∗(Xi+1 = · | x1, . . . xi), i.e. the conditional distribution684
of xi+1 according to the NML distribution p
∗, defined relative to some n i. As we have685
said before, in general p∗(Xi+1 | x1, . . . xi) is not the maximum likelihood distribution f(· |686
θˆ(x1, . . . , xi)). It is a complicated distribution that can usually be very well approximated687
by the predictive distribution based on Jeffreys’ prior (for large enough i, this predictive688
distribution is well-defined even if Jeffreys’ prior is improper). The goal in MDL is to design689
an estimator that, when used for sequentially predicting outcomes, predicts nearly as well690
as the ML estimator for the final sample x1, . . . , xn. This goal, however, is not achieved by691
predicting the individual xi+1 based on the ML estimator for x1, . . . , xi. Therefore, MDL692
parameter estimation is, in general, quite different from ML parameter estimation.693
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